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STATE OF THE ART -
WORLD WAR III
Drone submarine hunters are nothing new. DARPA has been shelling out contracts for such machines for some time. Other navies have been using unmanned boats for target practice for years and limited duration UUVs for mine hunting. The skies are littered with drones that are armed to the teeth, at present flying for the most part in uncontested airspace. There are also manned aircraft that are sold for
submarine hunting and naval mine disposal.
As with any war, it is vital to control enemy supply lines. If you manage to sink their shipping, both naval and merchant fleets, you will bring their economy to its knees and destroy their ability (and will) to fight. That is why the super powers keep building such huge battleships in large numbers, so that they control the high seas, or at least give the illusion of controlling the high
seas.
SEANET
A fleet of destroyers out to detect and sink an enemy submarine has a far greater chance of success than one ship working in lone fashion. The same principle applies to a fleet of drones, except that if working in unmanned mode, the drones may be far more effective when working together to execute a coordinated chase that increases the chances of cornering an enemy vessel, over a fleet of destroyers operating with a
human crew onboard, by the simple fact that an onboard
(AI)
computer program giving instructions to the vessels may also work with other vessels to close the gaps that a submarine might seek to use, taking instant action against incoming data, where a human
commander would take considerably more time to assimilate incoming data from screens, etc, and then issue orders - even then assuming that all of the convoy's captains were singing from the same hymn sheet.
The sequence below illustrates how such a system might work.
SEANET
EXAMPLE 1 - A nuclear submarine is cruising west trying to avoid detection
by a SeaWolf
pack of marine drones that is also on persistent patrol in regular
formation heading south. The unfortunate submarine and her crew are
inevitably located using advanced anti-submarine sensors, whereupon the
wolf pack typically monitor the sub's course in times of peace, passing
that information between drones and back to GHQ, but continue their patrol
south, until it is time to change tack.
In
times of war, the wolf pack will close on the submarine until within easy
range to be able to sink the vessel - as per the examples below. The
duration of a nuclear submarine is measured by the food on board. When it
runs out, either the crew will starve, or need to head to a port for
provisioning. The crew is thus the weakest link for any modern navy,
making unmanned warships a very attractive proposition. The submarine
commander has the choice of starving or surfacing to try and destroy the
surface drones.
SEANET
2- Once inside the net, the nuclear submarine captain realizes that they
have been spotted. He will also figure out that a drone Micro Battleship
(see the foot of this page) has so much firepower that he has little
chance of sinking one of them, let alone a Wolf Pack. He will thus seek to
evade capture, or sinking. Meantime the drone ASVs alter course and speed
working both independently and together to close the distance. Note that
the predicted zone moves ahead of the submarine. Commanders typically dive
deep once discovered to increase range to target and signal clutter - but
they cannot go deep enough to stop torpedo strikes.
SEANET
3 - The submarine captain changes course, diving down deep, which is
countered by the drones also changing direction, all the while closing the
gap. The sub cannot escape the net using its greater speed. It has to seek
to avoid capture tactically - and the torpedoes that can reach them at any
depth.
SEANET 4 - In this scenario the submarine captain desperately heads back out of the net, going to full speed, when this is an advantage. The drones can also sprint, but would not do so at this stage until a torpedo might be in range to fire. The computer controlled tactical command and control system outperforms human decision making ability many thousands of times over. Other surface drones are called in just in case a wider SeaNet is needed.
SEANET
5 - The drone ASVs will soon be within torpedo range. They have been
within missile range from the word go. This is an example using four
drones in a small patch of the ocean. In practice, the naval force
deploying SeaWolf
and SeaNet drones, will have certain strategic channels, or choke points,
that a wider network of HKs will be patrolling. Thus, making the use of
nuclear submarines untenable. Save only for hiding in the remotest
regions of the world as an offshore retaliatory strike threat. Even then,
a submarine will eventually need return to base for food, once again with
the crew being the weakest link. The crew will know this and it will not
be long before they start to panic - and that panic, at each meal time is
sure to have and effect on the subs commander.
SEANET
6 - Finally, the submarine is within torpedo range of the drones and
please note that the oceans are a vast expanse and these examples are not
drawn to scale. The drone in the south-east quadrant fires two heavyweight
torpedoes, with the drone covering the north-east quadrant ready to engage
should the submarine crew get lucky - and the south and north-west drones
closing in as well. RIP Submarines are well equipped with countermeasures
and can make a fight of it. Especially, the next generation that is
planned to try to take on the inevitable drone armies. But, it is simple
maths. It's $billions, versus $millions. The overwhelming numbers of
drones that will eventually seek to engage the target submarine will wear
the captain and crew down on any submarine planned for the future,
robotically, methodically and physically. In the end the submarine
commander might well have surfaced to at least attempt to take a couple of
the drone destroyers down - to go down fighting. Faced with certain death,
many crew would rather that than go down all hands like lambs to the
slaughter. This is a game of technology chess, in which technology will
always come out on top, not brute strength.
THE ENERGY SUPPLY CHAIN
The difference between drones at sea and drones in the air is:
1. The level of persistence.
2. The operational cost.
Drones in the air need to be refueled or they will crash. They thus have a limited range compared to a network of drones at sea that do not need to refuel - because they are powered by energy harvested from nature. At
that time in 2016 BMS was the first marine development company to suggest a format of vehicle that makes such operations possible.
Drones in the air are labour intensive at the moment, though Northrop Grumman are working on that, the refueling process needs men and support vehicles that will be manned. Unless of course drone aircraft carriers are developed that are capable of refueling drone aircraft. Even so, the limited range of continuous surveillance operations is a huge disadvantage and once the supply ships run out of aviation fuel, that is that. Until fresh supplies arrive. Conventional warfare is thus dependent on oil. It follows that in the next World War, oil wells and offshore platforms will be first strike targets. Simultaneous strike targets will be nuclear powered vessels and power stations.
NAVIGATION, COMMAND and CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS
GPS relies on satellites from various nations: UK, Europe, USA, etc. The first thing that will happen in the next world war scenario, is that the military will block all GPS usage. Indeed, as a first strike precaution, satellites will be a prime target. They will have to be knocked out.
That means of course, that SkyNet must be independent enough to still be able to communicate with naval drones and the drones with GHQ. Navigation must then go back a step, or forward if you prefer, to a stage where GPS is not relied on as the main navigation tool.
How then to operate SkyNet? And, how do you knock out the other side's satellites? The answer to those question, we are afraid, is classified.
WRITING ON THE STREET WALL - 24 OCTOBER 2014 - SINGAPORE
Last November, an unusual experiment took place in the congested waters of Singapore just a few weeks before a Chinese nuclear attack submarine passed through the adjacent Malacca Strait.
U.S. and Singaporean researchers used an underwater drone named Starfish to explore ways to monitor subsea activity in an experiment sponsored by the U.S. military and Singapore s defense ministry, say people involved.
The goal of the operation, named 'Project Mission,' was to link a Singaporean underwater surveillance system to an American one that is designed to track potentially hostile submarines. The trial was also part of a broader U.S. effort to use its own underwater drones, combined with data from friendly countries, to enhance a sub-snooping system that dates back to the early years of the Cold War.
From the 1950s, the U.S. listened for Soviet subs entering the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by stringing underwater microphones across the seabed around its coast and in strategic chokepoints, such as between the U.K. and Iceland.
These cable-linked hydrophones were part of a secret global network called Sound Surveillance System, or Sosus. The U.S. declassified Sosus in 1991, making it available for civilian purposes such as tracking illegal fishing or whaling.
But in recent years, the U.S. and its allies have reactivated or upgraded elements of the system in Asia, partly in response to renewed Russian undersea activity, but also to monitor
China's expanding submarine capabilities. It never went away per se, and so we if you will revitalized all the attributes or assets, says Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations.
The U.S. is now attempting to combine those fixed seabed systems, as well as sub-hunting ships and aircraft, with mobile networks of sensors, some mounted on underwater drones that can be deployed by ships, planes or subs, say officers familiar with the plans.
At the same time, those officers say, the U.S. Navy is exploring ways to tap data from sensors used by other countries in the region, especially around chokepoints that Chinese subs must pass to reach the Pacific and
Indian Oceans.
We re very close with the Australians in this regard, very close with the Japanese in this regard, working to a greater degree with the Koreans in this regard, the Singaporeans, Adm. Greenert is quoted as saying, The Malays, the Indonesians, are increasing their interest and willingness.
The exact location of Sosus hydrophones in Asia remains classified. Researchers and former submariners familiar with the system say there are several arrays around Japan, which played a key role hunting for Soviet subs in the
Cold
War, and around Australia's Christmas Island.
The problem with cable-based hydrophones is that they require regular maintenance and shore stations in friendly countries. Fixed seabed hydrophones can only act as a virtual trip wire, signaling that a sub is passing at that moment. They are also most effective in relatively deep water with little congestion.
Recent U.S. efforts have focused on developing mobile undersea surveillance networks for congested and shallow waters like those near China's coast.
The U.S. Navy has deployed one such network the Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance, or PLUS, system which uses seabed sensors and unmanned vehicles that relay data via satellite. We've deployed PLUS, says Adm. Greenert. We sent it out on a mission I can't tell you where and it was effective.
He says that PLUS requires further testing but that the Navy is already using some small undersea drones for anti-sub warfare.
The biggest obstacles: Most underwater drones run on batteries that last only a few hours, and communicating with them is tough, given how slowly data passes through water.
Using
renewable energy for such duties solves that
problem.
Both of those issues were demonstrated when the U.S. Navy deployed an undersea drone called the Bluefin-21 in the search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.
You can think of underwater telecommunications as being roughly where the Internet was 30 years ago, says Mandar Chitre, an expert in underwater acoustics at the National University of Singapore who took part in the November experiment.
Singapore has made significant advances in underwater acoustics in recent years, developing a system called UNET that monitors undersea activity off Singapore using a network of seabed sensors, undersea drones and surface nodes that relay data over a mobile-phone network.
Singaporean waters are considered especially challenging because of varying depth, busy shipping and the snapping shrimp - a creature whose distinctive noise has long troubled undersea-warfare specialists.
The experiment in November was to link the Singaporean network to a U.S. system called Seaweb, which is being developed by the Naval Postgraduate School with funding from the Office of Naval Research. The results were very good, Prof. Chitre says.
A spokeswoman for Singapore s Defense Ministry confirmed that it had co-sponsored the experiment on linking UNET to Seaweb, but didn t respond to questions about its broader purpose or applications to anti-submarine warfare.
Public information about Seaweb shows that it aims to create a new global network of submarine sensors from the U.S., its
NATO allies and other friendly countries.
Rear Adm. Philip Sawyer, commander of U.S. submarine forces in the Pacific was quoted as saying: The idea behind Seaweb, is to network various nodes through the undersea environment and be able to tap that data and bring it where you want, whether it s Singapore or San Diego. To be able to watch and monitor everything, we need a networked system. We could not agree more. BMS have had talks with marine military hard and software experts, who agree that with tweaking here and there to meet with international safety obligations, such a system can be made to work.
CHINA'S
CHOKE POINTS - In
December 2013, China s defense ministry summoned military attach s from
several embassies to its monolithic Beijing headquarters. To the
foreigners surprise, the Chinese said that one of their nuclear-powered
submarines would soon pass through the Strait of Malacca, a passage
between Malaysia and Indonesia that carries much of world trade, say
people briefed on the meeting.
Two days later, a Chinese attack sub - a so-called hunter-killer, designed
to seek out and destroy enemy vessels - slipped through the strait above
water and disappeared. It resurfaced near Sri Lanka and then in the
Persian Gulf, say people familiar with its movements, before returning
through the strait in February - the first known voyage of a Chinese sub
to the Indian Ocean.
The message was clear: China had fulfilled its four-decade quest to join
the elite club of countries with nuclear subs that can ply the high seas.
The defense ministry summoned attach s again to disclose another Chinese
deployment to the Indian Ocean in September this time a diesel-powered
sub, which stopped off in Sri Lanka. China s increasingly potent and
active sub force represents the rising power s most significant military
challenge yet for the region. Its expanding undersea fleet not only
bolsters China s nuclear arsenal but also enhances the country s
capacity to enforce its territorial claims and thwart U.S. intervention.
Submarines then are not the answer,
anti-submarine capability is the solution by way of fleet support - if
that is, a navy wants to keep ahead.
ASTUTE
CLASS SUBMARINES CHARACTERISTICS - WEAPONS & SYSTEMS
The Astute class has stowage for 38 weapons and would typically carry a mix of Spearfish heavy torpedoes and
Tomahawk Block IV cruise
missiles, the latter costing 870,000 each. The Tomahawk missiles are capable of hitting a target to within a few metres, to a range of 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometres). In May 2022, the
MOD announced that it would be upgrading these missiles to Block V standard from 2024, which boasts an extended range and modernised in-flight communication and target selection.
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